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An Economic Analysis of
Liability for AIDS-Contaminated
Blood Products*
The occurrence of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
(AIDS) in America has raised difficult new questions in the
fields of medicine, religion, and ethics. AIDS has invaded the
bedroom, the boardroom, and the hospital room-in the latter
case in the form of contaminated blood products. The law has
dealt with this challenge by relying on liability doctrines devel-
oped to deal with the threat of other blood-borne diseases such
as hepatitis. But because AIDS and hepatitis differ markedly
in their communicability, preventability, duration, and sever-
ity, reliance on those doctrines is ill-advised.
The purpose of this Comment is to develop an economic
analysis of possible blood products liability rules in order to
determine what the effects of such rules are on blood users
and providers. To the extent that current liability rules fail to
promote an efficient allocation of risks and resources, this
Comment will propose changes designed to correct such
deficiencies.
The economic analysis of liability rules relating to blood
products contamination requires an understanding of the
nature of the risks posed by AIDS and of the precautions that
blood providers and blood users may take to avoid those risks.
AIDS1 destroys the body's ability to fight infections, and
thus leaves its victim vulnerable to a host of opportunistic dis-
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this Comment.
1. AIDS has been defined as "a disease, at least moderately predictive of a defect
in cell-mediated immunity, occurring in a person with no known cause for diminished
resistance to that disease." Miller, Potential Liability for Transfusion Associated
AIDS, 253 J. A.M.A. 3419 (1985) [hereinafter Miller] (quoting Update on Acquired
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eases.2 AIDS is nearly always fatal. As of May, 1984, nearly
half of all persons diagnosed as having AIDS had died from the
disease.3
A wealth of information has been developed about the
methods of transmission of the disease since it was first
reported in the United States in June, 1981.4 Although not
conclusively proved, AIDS is thought to be transmitted by a
virus known as human t-cell leukemia virus III.' The most
common means of transmission of the virus are blood-to-blood
contact through the use of contaminated hypodermic needles,
and homosexual or heterosexual intercourse. AIDS can also
be communicated to hemophiliacs through the injection of con-
taminated clotting agents made from blood7 and by the trans-
fusion of other AIDS-contaminated blood and blood products.'
It is not known how many of those persons infected with
HIV will develop the AIDS complex, although the conversion
rate is now thought to be much higher than the twenty percent
rate originally estimated.9 The minimum dose of the virus
needed to cause infection is also unknown. 10
The long incubation period of HIV has hampered efforts to
calculate the extent of the spread of AIDS. The median incu-
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) - United States, 31 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 507 (1982)).
2. These diseases include Kaposi's sarcoma and other forms of cancer,
pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, herpes viruses, and various fungi. AIDS patients
usually suffer from a combination of these diseases. Check, Preventing AIDS
Transmission: Should Blood Donors Be Screened?, 249 J. A.M.A. 567, 568 (1983)
[hereinafter Check].
3. Marx, Strong New Candidate for AIDS Agent, 224 Sc. 475 (1984) [hereinafter
Marx].
4. Curran, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Associated with
Transfusions, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 69, 71 (1984) [hereinafter Curran].
5. Other related viruses are suspected as well. For simplicity, they will hereafter
be collectively referred to as human immunodeficiency viruses (HIV). Marx, supra
note 3, at 475.
6. Curran, supra note 4, at 69.
7. Id.; Miller, supra note 1, at 3419.
8. Friedland & Klein, Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 317
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1125 (1987) [hereinafter Friedland & Klein].
9. Prevention and Control of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 258 J.
A.M.A. 2097, 2097 (1987) [hereinafter Trustee's Report]. The extent of the spread of
AIDS is difficult to estimate. As of October, 1987, 1.5 million Americans had been
infected with HIV and 35,000 people had developed AIDS, of whom 20,000 had died.
Id. The number of AIDS cases is steadily growing, doubling every six months. Check,
supra note 2, at 568. It is estimated that by 1991, over 300,000 people will have
contracted AIDS and 200,000 people will have died from it. Trustee's Report, supra at
258.
10. Friedland & Klein, supra note 8, at 1126.
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bation period of HIV is estimated to be 4.5 years." During the
incubation period, an AIDS victim may have no apparent
symptoms. 12 It also appears that HIV antibodies, the presence
or absence of which is used as a test for AIDS, may not appear
for some time after infection has occurred.' 3
The spread of AIDS has been geographically concentrated.
Although AIDS cases have been reported in forty-seven states,
Washington D.C., Puerto Rico, and thirty-six foreign countries,
eighty percent of all cases reported as of June, 1985 had
occurred in six metropolitan areas, principally New York
City.14 Seventeen percent of AIDS cases occurred among
intravenous drug users. Eighty-two percent of these cases
occurred in New York City.'
5
Much progress has been made in developing precautionary
medical procedures to safeguard the general population from
accidental AIDS infection by the transfusion or use of blood
and blood products.
Currently, transfusion-related AIDS is prevented by heat-
treating blood products, by deferring donations of blood by
members of high-risk groups, and by testing 6 donated blood
for the presence of HIV antibodies.' 7 These measures have
been credited with reducing the risk of transfusion-related
AIDS infection to an extremely low level, currently estimated
to be between 1 in 100,000 and 1 in 1,000,000.18 In 1986, the
present value of direct and indirect losses caused by AIDS was
$275,890/individual/year, and is expected to increase to
$384,629/individual/year by 1991.1' For the purposes of this
11. Id. at 1125.
12. Curran, supra note 4, at 73.
13. ULENE, SAFE SEX IN A DANGEROUS WORLD 12 (1987) [hereinafter ULENE].
14. Friedland & Klein, supra note 8, at 1127.
15. Id.
16. Although it was recognized early in 1983 that those persons at high risk for
AIDS were also likely to belong to the same groups as those at high risk for hepatitis
B, and could thus be detected by the use of the hepatitis B test, widespread testing was
not advocated at that time. Check, supra note 2, at 570. The cost of such widespread
testing was a major factor in this decision. It was then estimated to cost between $5
million and $100 million. Id. The test also failed to register positive in approximately
10% of the cases in which it was administered to those known to have AIDS. Id.
17. Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in Transfusion Recipients and
Their Family Members, 257 J. A.M.A. 1860, 1860 (1987) [hereinafter HIV Infection in
Transfusion Recipients].
18. Friedland & Klein, supra note 8, at 1126.
19. Scitovsky & Rice, Estimates of the Direct and Indirect Costs of Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome in the United States, 1985, 1986, and 1991, 102 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 5, 7 (1987) [hereinafter Scitovsky & Rice].
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Comment, these rough probability and loss estimates will be
multiplied to produce an approximation of the present
expected value of the risk of receiving HIV-contaminated
blood equal to $1.82 per unit of transfused blood.'
It is estimated that 600 persons were infected with HIV by
transfusion during a period in which 60,000,000 units of blood
were transfused. Of this infected group, all but one or two
received transfusions before widespread blood testing was com-
menced in early 1985.21
The current test for HIV antibodies is not fail-safe;2 it
does not detect those persons who, though infected with HIV,
have not yet developed HIV antibodies. These antibodies may
not develop until after one is infectious.23 At least one case of
HIV infection has been traced to donated blood that tested
negative for HIV.24 The virtual cessation of transfusion-related
AIDS since the commencement of testing suggests, however,
that such cases are exceedingly rare.25
I. WHO ARE THE VICTIMS?
The victims of blood-related AIDS infection can be
roughly divided into three groups. The first group of victims is
comprised of hemophiliacs. Hemophilia is a hereditary disease
that causes its victims to bleed excessively.2" Hemostatic integ-
20. This figure was arrived at by averaging the projected costs for 1986 and 1988,
and multiplying that figure by an average of the low and high estimates of the
probability of contamination. Thus, (($275,890.00 + $384,629.00)/2) x ((1/100,000 +
1/1,000,000)/2) = $1.82.
21. Mayer, The Community: Still the Best Supply of Blood, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Apr., 1987 at 5 [hereinafter Mayer]; HIV Infection in Transfusion Recipients,
supra note 17, at 1860.
22. Nor is it cheap. Although the initial personal screening test costs about $6.50
wholesale, patients wishing to know their immune status will pay between $20 and
$150, depending on the geographic location. ULENE, supra note 13, at 77.
23. Miller, supra note 1, at 3422.
24. Transfusion-Associated Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III/
Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus Infection from a Seronegative Donor-Colorado, 35
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 389-91 (1986), reprinted in REPORTS ON AIDS:
JUNE 1986-MAY 1987, 2 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 3 (1987) [hereinafter
Transfusion].
25. Further, the absolute number of donated units of blood that tested positive for
HIV is small, and is declining. Of all units tested in the U.S. in 1985, 0.04% tested
positive for HIV. By 1986, the number had dropped to 0.02%. Id.
26. Such bleeding is caused by a deficiency of the antihemophilic factor (factor
VIII in classic hemophilia or factor IX in hemophilia B), usually present in the blood
in trace amounts and necessary for the formation of blood clots. The spectrum of
disability caused by hemophilia runs from those who bleed excessively only after a
major injury to the circulatory system and who may lead normal lives, to those who
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rity of the blood may be achieved for several hours by the
injection of potent concentrates of antihemophilic factor VIII
(factor VIII), which is made from the blood plasma of donors.
This injection is usually accomplished by the patient himself,
with factor VIII being provided by prescription on an out-
patient basis.28
Factor VIII is made in two ways.' The method most com-
monly employed by commercial plasmapheresis centers, which
produce eighty percent of the clotting agent used,30 involves
the pooling of the blood of between 5,000 and 50,000 paid
donors.3 1 This pooling method creates a high risk of contami-
nation, since the entire batch may be contaminated by one
infected donor. Each batch of clotting factor is then distrib-
uted to 100 hemophiliacs12 Risk of exposure is further height-
ened by the fact that a hemophiliac may be exposed to several
batches of factor VIII over the course of a few years.3 3
The second method of production is the cryoprecipitate
process. In this process, only one donor's blood is used to cre-
ate a particular batch of factor VIII.' Thus, the risk of infec-
tion from a particular batch of cryoprecipitated factor VIII is
several hundred times lower than the risk presented by pooled
factor VIII. The cryoprecipitate method is primarily used by
blood banks and hospitals.'
The second group of victims is comprised of elective
donees. As defined in this Comment, elective donees are those
who receive whole blood or blood components as part of elec-
tive medical treatment, usually surgery. Elective donees differ
from other transfusion-related AIDS victims in that their
exposure to blood products is, by definition, completely
voluntary.
The third group of victims of transfusion-related AIDS is
suffer crippling deformities due to internal bleeding in the joints. 6 McGRAw-HILL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 554 (1982).
27. Id.
28. Miller, supra note 1, at 3423.
29. Hepatitis, AIDS and the Blood Product Exemption from Strict Products
Liability in California: A Reassessment, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1101, 1116 (1986)
[hereinafter Blood Product Exemption ].
30. Check, supra note 2, at 567.
31. Blood Product Exemption, supra note 29, at 1125 n.169.
32. Check, supra note 2, at 568; Marx, supra note 3, at 475.
33. Check, supra note 2, at 568.
34. Blood Product Exemption, supra note 29, at 1126.
35. Id.
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comprised of emergency donees. As defined in this Comment,
emergency donees are those persons who need blood transfu-
sions on an emergency basis but who, because of the emergent
nature of their need, are unsuitable candidates for autologous
transfusions. Emergency donees are likely to use the same type
of whole blood products as elective donees, since both are
administered to replace blood lost either through surgery or
trauma.
Hemophiliacs, elective donees, and emergency donees dif-
fer markedly in their ability to avoid the risk of AIDS-contam-
inated blood products. A significant percentage of
hemophiliacs can successfully substitute cryoprecipitated factor
VIII for factor VIII mass-produced by the pooling method,"6
reducing their exposure to HIV infection. However, cryo-
precipitated factor VIII has several drawbacks. It is not as con-
venient as mass-produced factor VIII, which is freeze dried and
requires no special refrigeration to storey Cryoprecipitated
factor VIII is also not as effective as freeze dried concentrate in
treating severe hemophilia. Further, because pooling allows
factor VIII to be mass-produced, it is likely to be less costly
than cryoprecipitated factor VIII, which is produced in single
lots.
Furthermore, substituting cryoprecipitated factor VIII for
freeze dried factor VIII may no longer be cost effective as a
preventive measure. As stated above, the heat disinfection of
blood products has reduced the risk of AIDS infection to virtu-
ally zero. Although there is a .02 percent chance of contracting
HIV through the use of heat treated factor VIII made from the
blood of unscreened donors, there have been no documented
cases of infection from factor VIII when both screening tests
and heat treatment are used."8 Because blood screening tests
and heat disinfection are both used by all U.S. producers,3 9 the
risk of HIV infection and the need for substitutes are
negligible.
Elective donees may take a number of precautionary
measures to avoid exposure to HIV. They can abstain from
36. Blood Product Exemption, supra note 29, at 1127 n.180.
37. Id. at 1126.
38. Survey of Non-U.S. Hemophilia Treatment Centers for HIV Seroconversions
Following Therapy With Heat-Treated Factor Concentrates, 36 MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 121, 123 (1987) [hereinafter Survey of Non-U.S. Hemophilia
Treatment Centers].
39. See id. at 123.
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surgery, they can use blood donated by persons known to
them, or they can use their own blood during surgery through
the process of autologous transfusion. Whether elective donees
should take such precautions depends on whether the expected
value of the risk of infection is high enough to warrant the
costs attending such precautions.
Abstaining from surgery in order to avoid blood transfu-
sion absolutely prevents the possibility of contracting AIDS
from transfused blood. However, this may not be an efficient
precautionary measure. Although not the subject of docu-
mented studies, it is logical to assume that, for many people,
the benefits of a proposed surgical treatment far outweigh the
slight risk of contracting AIDS through transfused blood, val-
ued above at $1.82 per unit.4 °
It is unclear whether directed donation is a cost effective
method of preventing HIV infection through elective blood
use. Directed donations are those that an elective donee solicits
from donors whom he knows personally. The rationale behind
directed donation is that pre-selected donors will be less likely
to be infected with HIV and more likely to disclose such infec-
tion if they are infected.4 Both issues are currently debated in
the medical profession.'
40. See supra note 20 and related text.
41. Further, because they are not paid for their blood, they have no economic
incentive to lie about their potential exposure to HIV, unlike those who sell their
blood out of necessity. A study completed at Cedars-Sinai Hospital indicates that there
is no statistically significant difference in the occurrence of HIV infection in directed
donors versus randomly selected volunteer donors. Goldfinger, The Case for Directed
Donations, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr., 1987 at 8 [hereinafter Goldfinger].
42. Compare, Mayer, supra note 21 with Goldfinger, supra note 41. Proponents of
directed donation argue that potential donees can select donors who are at low risk of
having AIDS, such as their own parents, siblings, and pre-sexual teenagers.
Goldfinger, supra note 41, at 7-8. They also argue that, unlike paid donors, preselected
donors will have an incentive to disclose an abnormal risk of HIV infection because
they know the recipient. Id. at 7.
Opponents of directed donation, most notably the American Red Cross and the
American Association of Blood Banks, have stated that directed donation is not in the
best interest of the patient. Id. They argue that directed donation is not safer than
anonymous volunteer donation. Id. They agree with proponents of directed donation
that volunteer donors are more likely to be repeat donors, and thus more likely to
have been previously screened for HIV. Mayer, supra note 21, at 6. They contend,
however, that directed donors will be unlikely to disclose their potential exposure to
HIV because of the stigma of membership in high risk groups such as homosexuals and
intravenous drug users. Id. They support this contention with the report of a directed
donor who intentionally donated blood, even though he knew he was infected with
HIV. Id. Because volunteer donors are more likely than directed donors to have been
previously screened for HIV, and thus eliminated from the test pool, the fact that
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Autologous transfusion, usually involving the pre-deposit
of the patient's own blood for use during surgery, is a much
less controversial alternative to directed donation, and is con-
sidered safe and effective.4 3 Autologous blood transfusion can-
not spread infection and eliminates all risk of adverse reactions
to blood donated by others." Although it is the safest source
of transfusible blood, autologous transfusion is not currently
used in every case in which it is a medically possible alterna-
tive to volunteer donations.45
Besides being safe, autologous transfusion may be cost
effective. Ten of eighteen blood centers studied did not charge
their patients more for autologous transfusions than for other
transfusions.46 Five charged more for autologous transfusions,
citing the need to recoup added costs of shipping and han-
dling.47 Three charged less on the basis of reduced donor
recruitment costs.48 Indirect costs to the patient include defer-
ring surgery until such time as pre-deposit is completed, as
well as the expense incurred by the patient in travelling to the
donation site and the physical discomfort of giving blood.49
However, there is no indication that these costs would be sys-
tematically greater for autologous blood donors than for volun-
teers.' Such a determination would likely depend on the facts
directed donors did not have a higher incidence of HIV infection than public
volunteers has been interpreted as demonstrating that directed donors are, as a class,
less likely to be infected with HIV. Goldfinger, supra note 41, at 8.
43. Mayer, supra note 21, at 7.
44. Toy, Predeposited Autologous Blood for Elective Surgery, 316 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 517 (1987) [hereinafter Toy].
45. Id.
46. Id. at 518.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 519.
50. Opponents of directed donation argue that giving patients the option to request
directed donation may have adverse effects on both the patient and the community
blood supply. Patients who cannot immediately find directed donors may postpone
needed treatment until such donors are found, thereby endangering the patient's
health. Reiss & Pindyck, Reconciling Patients' Wishes with the Public Good,
HALTINGS CENTER REP. Apr., 1987, at 9. Proponents counter that, unless given the
right to use pre-selected donors, patients may forego needed treatment. Id. Opponents
also fear that directed donation threatens the community blood supply by giving
potential volunteer donors an incentive to withhold their blood in anticipation of being
called to donate specifically for a friend or relative. Mayer, supra note 21, at 6.
Proponents counter that interviews with directed donors have indicated that not only
are directed donors unlikely to withhold blood, but they are actually likely to begin to
donate blood voluntarily, thus reducing recruitment costs to blood banks while
increasing the community blood supply.
[Vol. 12:75
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of individual cases.
Autologous transfusion may create external benefits for
the community blood supply. One authority has estimated that
autologous pre-deposit of blood could reduce the demands of
elective donees upon the community blood supply by ten per-
cent.5 This may be especially important in light of new regula-
tions regarding the screening of blood for hepatitis, which may
reduce the blood supply by as much as seven percent.52 This
decrease in the demand of elective donees would make more
blood available to other users unable to pre-donate.53 Allowing
autologous donees to pay the same price for blood as those
receiving volunteer donations may be a legitimate means of
allowing autologous donees to capture some of the external
benefit that they bestow upon other donees.
Emergency donees can take few cost effective measures to
prevent the risk of transfusion-related AIDS. Persons engaged
in high risk employment or high risk recreational activities
could decrease their participation in those activities, and thus
decrease their chances of requiring emergency blood transfu-
sions. But given the current slight risk of transfusion-related
AIDS, it is unlikely that such a decrease in employment or rec-
reation would prove to be a cost effective precaution. It seems
even less likely that persons engaged in activities that entail a
slight risk of serious injury, such as driving a car, would be
willing to forego those activities in order to gain a marginal
increase in safety.
Aside from the ability to avoid the risk of AIDS, the three
groups of victims differ in their ability to insure against the
costs of the disease if it does strike. Thus, the efficiency of pro-
viding insurance for these groups by imposing strict liability' 4
differs as well. Because elective and emergency donees are not
demographically distinct groups, insurers are unlikely to class-
ify them as a separate risk pool. Their ability to procure first-
party insurance should, therefore, be unaffected by the risk of
transfusion-related AIDS. The following discussion of insura-
bility will therefore deal only with hemophiliacs.
The insurability 5 of a risk varies with the randomness of
51. Toy, supra note 44, at 519.
52. Surgenor, The Patient's Blood is the Safest Blood, 316 NEw ENG. J. MED. 542
(1987).
53. Toy, supra note 44, at 519.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 100-105.
55. The following discussion is based upon Hammond & Shapiro, AIDS and the
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its occurrence: the more random the risk, the more likely that
it will be underwritten.56 In the case of hemophiliacs, the
chance of infection by contaminated clotting factor has gone
from nearly one (represented by a ninety-two percent infection
rate before widespread blood screening and heat disinfection)
to nearly zero.57 The randomness of the risk of infection to
those hemophiliacs not yet infected is therefore similar to the
risk facing the general population and favors insurability.
Insurability also increases as uncertainty of the likelihood
or magnitude of a loss decreases .5  Because of the great public
interest in AIDS, and the passage of almost seven years since
AIDS was first reported in the United States, the risk to
hemophiliacs of infection through blood products has been reg-
ularly documented by the Centers for Disease Control, and has
been the subject of numerous studies.59 The cost of AIDS
claims has also been established by the medical community. 0
Although uncertainty as to both the occurrence of HIV infec-
tion and the cost of the disease remains, such uncertainty may
now be reduced to a manageable level.
The price of insuring a risk directly affects an insurer's
ability to underwrite that risk.6" If insurance premiums are
too high, they may be unaffordable to the people who need
coverage for the risk. When an insurer calculates a premium,
he must charge an amount over the expected value of the risk
in order to provide for the contingency of unexpectedly high
adverse claim results.62 When the probability or magnitude of
loss is uncertain, the contingency load must be high, and may
make the total premium unaffordable. 3
In the case of hemophiliacs, the present risk of HIV infec-
tion through factor VIII use is very low. Furthermore, a signif-
icant amount of information is available regarding the
Limits of Insurability, 64 MILBANK Q. 143 (Supp. I 1986) [hereinafter Hammond &
Shapiro].
56. Id. at 145-56.
57. Survey of Non-U.S. 'Hemophilia Treatment Centers, supra note 38, at 121, 123.
58. Hammond & Shapiro, supra note 55, at 146-47.
59. E.g., Surveillance of Hemophilia-Associated Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome, 256 J. A.M.A. 3205 (1986). Jason, HTLV-III/LAV Antibody and Immune
Status of Household Contacts and Sexual Partners of Persons with Hemophilia, 255 J.
A.M.A. 212 (1986).
60. Scitovsky & Rice, supra note 19.
61. Hammond & Shapiro, supra note 55, at 145.
62. Id. at 147-48.
63. Id.
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potential cost of an AIDS claim. Thus, the contingency load
reflecting the relative uncertainty of these factors should not
be significantly higher than that charged to insure
hemophiliacs before the onslaught of AIDS.
Moral hazard also affects the ability to insure a risk. If,
because he is insured, a person is motivated to take signifi-
cantly less precaution against a risk, or fails to minimize dam-
ages once an insured event occurs, moral hazard is present. 4
Information asymmetry and the adverse selection that
may result from this asymmetry may increase moral hazard
and are potential obstacles to the insurability of all AIDS vic-
tims. Because the HIV antibody test is available to the general
public, a person who believes himself at risk for HIV infection
may undergo voluntary testing to determine whether he, in
fact, has the disease. If insurers are legally barred from using
the same test to screen policy applicants, those applicants will
be able to insure themselves against a risk that they already
know has matured; this causes a chronic adverse selection
problem.65
If insurers are barred from using the HIV screening test,
they will likely turn to other means of avoiding adverse selec-
tion, such as the use of demographic proxies (e.g., sex, geo-
graphic location, and marital status).66 Using such proxies to
combat adverse selection, however, would cause needless
uncertainty, increasing the contingency load of insurance pre-
miums and, therefore, the total cost of the premium.
Hemophiliacs can do little, if anything, to increase their
exposure to HIV through blood products. Further, the
chance that hemophiliacs will recklessly engage the risk
against which they are insured is lessened by the fact that
AIDS is a fatal disease. Although it is possible that
hemophiliacs who are insured may consume more health care
than they would if not insured, this threat is no different than
that posed by insurance against other terminal illnesses.68
64. Id.
65. Id. at 151.
66. Id. at 149-50.
67. Although foreign factor producers may not screen blood used, the increased
risk as opposed to American products, which are both screened and heat treated, is not
statistically significant. Survey of Non-US. Hemophilia Treatment Centers, supra note
38, at 121-24.
68. Hammond & Shapiro, supra note 55, at 148.
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Thus, moral hazard does not pose an obstacle to the insurabil-
ity of hemophiliacs.
In sum, the problems of randomness, uncertainty, high
contingency loading, moral hazard, and adverse selection,
which have been cited as obstacles to the insurance of homo-
sexuals against AIDS, do not present serious problems for the
insurance of hemophiliacs. This is especially true when insur-
ers are allowed to use relatively accurate HIV screening tests
to prevent adverse selection.
II. WHO ARE THE PROVIDERS OF BLOOD
AND BLOOD PRODUCTS?
Just as the users of blood products can be grouped accord-
ing to their relative abilities to avoid the risk of receiving con-
taminated blood products, blood providers can also be grouped
according to their ability to avoid manufacturing or providing
contaminated products.
Hospitals comprise the first group of producers. It is
assumed that hospitals and similar medical facilities are
responsible for the majority of blood transfused in the United
States. Such transfusions are usually incidental to the provi-
sion of more comprehensive medical treatment. Hospitals also
produce factor VIII, using the cryoprecipitate method. Hospi-
tals do not use paid donors as a source of blood for either
transfusions or factor VIII production. 9 The close nature of
hospital contact with patients allows hospitals to administer
more precisely a program of autologous transfusion than can
blood banks.70
Blood banks comprise a second group of producers. Blood
banks do not administer blood transfusions. Their roles are
limited to the collection of whole blood and blood components,
and to the cryoprecipitate production of factor VIII.7 1 Blood
banks do not use paid donors.7 2 Unlike hospitals, blood banks
do not deal directly with patients and have no ability to weigh
the relative benefits and costs of transfusion to particular
patients. Blood banks are in a superior position, however, to
69. Blood Product Exemption, supra note 29, at 1126.
70. Goldfinger, supra note 41, at 8.
71. Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Blood Policy and Technology
4 (1985) [hereinafter BLOOD POLICY].
72. Blood Product Exemption, supra note 29, at 1126; cf. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 1626 (West 1979).
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judge the suitability of prospective donors and to assure that
candidates belonging to groups at high risk of HIV infection do
not donate blood. Like hospitals, blood banks have a relatively
large base of ultimate consumers over which they can spread
losses caused by HIV infected blood.73
Commercial blood products manufacturers comprise the
third group of producers. Commercial manufacturers differ
from hospitals and blood banks in both their total share of the
factor VIII market and in the methods that they employ in the
production of factor VIII. While hospitals and blood banks
both use the cryoprecipitate method of production, blood prod-
ucts manufacturers pool the blood of up to 50,000 donors to
make factor VIII.74 Blood products manufacturers also differ
from hospitals and blood banks in that they rely on paid
donors for their blood supply.75 Like blood banks, commercial
manufacturers are easily able to screen potential donors
through the use of blood screening tests and questionnaires,
and by keeping records of those individuals whose blood has
tested positive for HIV after previous donations.
III. LIABILITY RULES AND THEIR ECONOMIC EFFECTS
A. No Liability
Those who adhere to the popular modern sentiment that
"someone should pay" when a person has been injured would
likely vehemently resist a rule that allowed blood products
manufacturers to completely escape liability for AIDS infec-
tion caused by their products. Ironically, although no jurisdic-
tion has established absolute immunity for blood-related AIDS
transmission, a rule of no liability may be precisely the practi-
cal result of developments in the theories of strict liability and
negligence in this context.
B. Negligence
Judge Learned Hand implicitly recognized the economic
underpinnings of negligence law in United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 76 : "in algebraic terms[,]77 if the probability [of an
73. The number of transfusions is great. Between 1981 and 1985, over 60,000,000
units of blood were transfused. Mayer, supra note 21, at 5.
74. Blood Product Exemption, supra note 29, at 1125 n.169.
75. Id. at 1116.
76. 159 F.2d 169, rehg denied, 160 F.2d 482 (2d. Cir. 1947).
77. The orthodox, non-mathematical formulation of negligence is generally
1988]
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injury occurring] be called P; the injury L; and the burden [of
taking precautions against the injury] B; liability depends upon
whether B is less than L multiplied by P; i.e., whether B [is
less than] PL.""8 In essence, Hand's formulation recognized
that the law should encourage all parties to a potential acci-
dent to take all economically efficient precautions, as calcu-
lated under the assumption that every other party is also
taking due care to avoid the accident.79
Two economically important defenses exist that, to differ-
ing degrees, will protect the defendant from liability for negli-
gence. First, comparative or contributory negligence on the
part of the plaintiff will diminish the plaintiff's recovery in
proportion to his own responsibility for his injury. Second, the
defendant will be protected if he can show that the plaintiff
voluntarily assumed the risk of injury, or has knowingly
entered into an agreement, before the accident, to release the
defendant from negligence liability. These rules are designed
to give victims an incentive to take all cost effective precau-
tions against a risk.
Negligence is essentially the only theory under which
plaintiffs can now recover for injuries caused by the use of
HIV contaminated blood products."0 Existing negligence law,
however, does not provide a source of hope for such plaintiffs.
For example, in Tufaro v. Methodist Hospital, Inc.,"" the
plaintiff brought an action in negligence against a blood bank
for failing to detect malaria in a unit of blood that it had pro-
vided for transfusion. The court cited the low incidence of
malaria in the United States as insufficient cause to require a
blood bank to take any precautions other than to ask potential
donors whether they had ever contracted malaria and to follow
established industry procedures if the answer was positive.
The risks discussed in Tufaro are analogous to the risk of HIV
expressed as "the failure to use such care as a reasonably prudent and careful person
would use under similar circumstances or failure to do what a person of ordinary
prudence would have done under similar circumstances." Amoco Chem. Corp. v. Hill,
318 A.2d 614, 617 (Del. 1974).
78. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173.
79. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 147-51 (3rd ed. 1986) [hereinafter R.
POSNER].
80. Matthews & Neslund, The Initial Impact of AIDS on Public Health Law in the
United States-1986, 257 J. A.M.A. 344, 346 (1986); Rabkin & Rabkin, Individual and
Institutional Liability for Transfusion-Acquired Diseases, 256 J. A.M.A. 2241, 2242
(1986) [hereinafter Rabkin & Rabkin].
81. 368 So. 2d 1219 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
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infection to persons using blood products. The incidence of
blood products related AIDS is now so low that it would be
reasonable for a court to mimick Tufaro in holding that the
current procedures for preventing HIV contamination are suf-
ficient, if followed, to avoid negligence liability.
Further, the practical problems of proving a case of negli-
gence are substantial for all classes of blood products related
HIV victims. Those problems may, in fact, completely bar
hemophiliacs from recovery in negligence. Hemophiliacs use
several lots of coagulant in the course of a year. 2 Because
users infected with HIV will be asymptomatic for a lengthy
period of time, a hemophiliac plaintiff may not realize that he
has been infected until after he may have inadvertently
destroyed evidence identifying the manufacturer of the infec-
tious coagulant. Thus, he may be unable to establish that any
particular producer was the cause-in-fact of his injury. This
problem would be eliminated if he brought suit in a jurisdic-
tion applying the "enterprise liability" theory of Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories.3
82. Blood Product Exemption, supra note 29, at 1125 n.169.
83. Such negligence is normally established only where there is a violation of the
guidelines governing the operation of blood banks. (The reference work usually relied
upon is STANDARDS FOR BLOOD BANKS AND TRANSFUSION SERVICES (P. Schmidt 11th
ed.)). In order to hold one liable for negligent behavior, there must be more than
simply a showing that the defendant was the cause in fact of the plaintiff's injury.
First, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant is under a duty to use reasonable
care to avoid injuring the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
failed to conform his behavior to the proper standard of care, as described by Judge
Hand, above. Third, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's negligence was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Proximate cause is established only when
the plaintiff can show that the defendant's actions were the cause in fact of the
plaintiff's injury, and that the injury to the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable to the
defendant. Fourth, the plaintiff must prove that he suffered cognizable damages as a
result of the defendant's actions. W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, TORTS 144
(7th ed. 1982).
The hemophiliac plaintiff may have ways of improving his chances for recovery.
For example, the doctrine of enterprise liability may apply. In Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories, 26 Cal.3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal.Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980), the plaintiff was injured by a drug administered to her mother during
pregnancy. The plaintiff knew the type of drug involved, but could not identify the
manufacturer of the drugs actually ingested. Although the plaintiff was unable to
identify the manufacturer who was the cause in fact of her injuries, making a
traditional case of negligence impossible to prove, the Sindell court nevertheless held a
group of drug manufacturers liable. The court based its holding largely on the
difficulties of proof presented to the plaintiff whose injury manifests itself long after
exposure to the defendant's product. The court stated that:
"as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should
bear the cost of the injury. Here.... [the] plaintiff is not at fault in failing to
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Even if the plaintiff can thus establish causation, it may be
impossible to determine when the infectious coagulant was
produced. It would therefore be impossible to identify the stan-
dard of care within the industry at the time the lot was manu-
factured, or to show that the defendant's conduct failed to
meet that standard of care. The latter point would not hold if
the plaintiff could show that the defendant had never exer-
cised due care, or if the defendant could show that he had
always exercised due care.
Proof of negligence in the case of elective and emergency
donees should be somewhat easier. In the case of both of these
groups of victims, their exposure to blood products will be doc-
umented by hospital records.' Thus, the ability of these types
of victims to identify their injurer, 5 to determine the standard
of care at the relevant time, and to show whether that stan-
dard was observed should be considerably easier than in the
case of hemophiliacs.
1. Economic Effects of Negligence Liability
Shavell's analysis of the economic effects of strict liability
and negligence86 demonstrates that a liability rule of negli-
provide evidence of causation, and although the absence of such evidence is
not attributable to the defendants either, their conduct in marketing a drug
the effects of which are delayed for many years played a significant role in
creating the unavailability of proof."
Id. at -, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. In essence, the burden of proof was
shifted to the defendants, who were required to demonstrate affirmatively that they
could not have made the substance which injured the plaintiff. A willing court could
easily analogize the plaintiff in Sindell to an HIV-infected hemophiliac and thereby
rationalize imposing liability on all manufacturers of factor VIII, subject to their abil-
ity to disprove fault. The Sindell rule was recently modified. See Brown v. Superior
Court, No. 25059 (Cal. March 31, 1988) (1988 WL 26807) (drug companies cannot be
held jointly liable for the entire amount of a judgment recovered under a theory of
enterprise liability).
84. Such records would be admissible as evidence. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
85. The question of donor liability for contaminated blood is not settled. The
court in Hubbell v. South Nassau Communities Hosp., 46 Misc. 2d 847, 260 N.Y.S.2d 539
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965), although not deciding the case on the merits, implied that normal
negligence rules might apply to suits against blood donors who know, or should know,
that they are infected with HIV and yet donate blood. However, problems may exist in
discovering the identities of such negligent donors. At least one court has endorsed a
hospital's refusal to make records of donors available to plaintiffs suing for injuries
received from infected blood. Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Serv. Inc., 500 So. 2d
533 (1987) (prohibiting discovery of blood donor records); but see Gulf Coast Regional
Blood Center v. Houston, 745 S.W.2d 557 (1988) (permitting discovery of blood donor
records).
86. The following discussion is taken from Shavell, Strict Liability Versus
Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
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gence will cause producers to ignore the external costs of non-
negligently caused injuries.8 7 This, in turn, will cause them to
charge a price for their product that does not reflect the
expected value of non-negligent accidents.88 If consumers of
the product fail to perceive correctly the full cost of the prod-
uct, which is the sum of both the price charged by the manu-
facturer and the expected value of any damages they will
suffer due to non-negligently caused accidents, consumers will
buy a different amount than they would deem efficient, in
light of their tastes and preferences.89 Because this amount is
different than the precise amount that the consumer would
deem efficient if fully and accurately informed, the amount is
economically suboptimal9 ° Conversely, when the consumer
knows the full cost of the product, he will purchase an optimal
quantity of the product. 1 Aside from the effects of negligence
liability on supply and demand, negligence liability with a
defense of contributory or comparative negligence will moti-
vate both producers and users to exercise due care to avoid
blood products related infection.
Under a negligence rule of liability, producers would exer-
cise due care to avoid risks in order to avoid legal liability. As
stated earlier, due care is defined as taking precautions against
a risk up to the exact point that the cost of those precautions
equals the expected value of the risk. A producer will not
expend resources to take precautions that cost more than the
expected value of the risk to be avoided because they will not
be responsible for losses caused by failure to take such precau-
tions, and thus, they have no incentive to do so.
Under a negligence rule, users would also exercise due
care to avoid contamination from HIV-contaminated blood
products. This is so because, under a rule of comparative or
contributory negligence, an injured person's damage award is
reduced if he is at all responsible for his own injury. Users
will also be motivated to take due care in order to avoid bear-
ing the entire cost of losses resulting from the non-negligent
behavior of producers.92
87. Id. at 2.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 3.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. For this observation I thank Professor Thomas Holdych of the University of
Puget Sound School of Law.
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Some inefficiencies may result under a rule of negligence
liability. Parties to a transaction will expend inefficient
amounts of care to the extent that they incorrectly estimate
the likelihood that the other party will be held liable for any
resulting injuries. If users over-estimate the safety of a prod-
uct, and thus over-estimate the likelihood that the product's
producer will be held negligent for manufacturing the product,
two effects will follow.
First, the user's estimation of the probability of an acci-
dent will be lower, which will decrease the amount of care he
will be willing to take to avoid an accident. Second, a user's
estimation of the likelihood that a manufacturer will be liable
for that loss will decline because it will appear more likely that
the loss was not caused by the manufacturer's lack of due care.
This will increase the perceived magnitude of potential losses
to be borne by the user, and he will correspondingly increase
the amount of care he takes. The net effect of these forces
may be to cancel one another, having no impact on the incen-
tives to producers and users.
C. Strict Liability in Tort and in Contract
Strict liability may be established in two ways. First, strict
liability may theoretically93 be imposed on the basis of a breach
of an express or implied warranty. Under section 2-313 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), an express warranty is
created when a seller represents that his goods will be of a cer-
tain quality.
Second, under section 2-314 of the U.C.C., a warranty is
implied by law when the seller is a merchant of the type of
goods in question. The seller is deemed by law to have war-
ranted that the quality of his goods will essentially be unobjec-
tionable to those who regularly purchase his products.
Finally, under section 2-315 of the U.C.C., an implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose may arise when the
seller knows that the buyer is going to use the product for a
particular purpose and the buyer relies on the seller to select
and provide goods suitable for that purpose.
The economic benefits of liability based upon breach of
warranty are that the seller has much greater certainty con-
93. Some states have legislatively classified the provision of blood as a sale, rather
than a service, thereby exempting it from the operation of the Uniform Commercial
Code. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1979).
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cerning both to whom he will be liable and, if the seller has
included a proper limitation of warranty in the contract, the
extent of such liability. Thus, a seller will need to keep less
resources available to pay for unexpectedly adverse liability.
He can instead put this money to more productive use.
The cost of resolving disputes over the quality or safety of
goods sold may also be lower under a warranty standard than
under a negligence standard, at least when the warranty is
express. In such a case, goods are warranted by the seller to
have attributes "X," "Y," and "Z." The trier of fact in any
resulting suit will be limited to simply determining whether or
not the product had attributes "X," "Y," and "Z." Since these
facts are objectively determinable, the costs of such a determi-
nation are likely to be much lower than under the objective,
"reasonable man" standard of negligence.
On the other hand, implied warranties of merchantability
offer little more certainty than the objective standard of negli-
gence. Determinations of what is "reasonable care" and what is
"merchantable" are equally vague, requiring relatively more
resources to establish, and offering little precedential value.
Because strict liability in warranty is theoretically limited
to those in privity of contract with the seller, those persons not
in privity who are injured by products will not be compen-
sated. Proponents of liberal compensation of victims have
developed both legislative and judicial methods to circumvent
this limitation.
For example, legislatures may choose to extend a duty of
warranty to third parties. Section 2-318 of the U.C.C. presents
three alternative extensions of a seller's warranty to third par-
ties. Under alternative "A," a seller's warranty extends to
members of the buyer's family and guests in his home if it is
reasonable to expect that they will be affected by the goods.94
Under alternative "C," a seller's warranty extends to all per-
sons who may foreseeably be affected by the product whether
or not they are related to the buyer.95 The damages recover-
able under such third-party warranties vary from providing
only compensation for personal injury96 to providing compen-
sation for both personal injury and property damages.9
94. U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative A (1977).
95. Id. Alternative C.
96. Id. Alternative B.
97. Id. Alternatives A & C.
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Strict liability has also been imposed in tort and may com-
pletely eclipse any limitations imposed by contract law. Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that a
seller of an injury-causing product shall be liable to the ulti-
mate user or consumer of the product for both personal injury
and property damage. Section 402A applies even though the
seller has exercised all possible care, not merely reasonable
care, and even though the user or consumer has no contractual
relationship with the seller.98
Product defects under section 402A fall into two general
categories: "design defects" and "manufacturing defects."' A
product is defective in design if the safety expectations of the
ordinary consumer are not met,"°° or if the risks of its design
outweigh the design's benefits. 101 Thus, liability is not, strictly
speaking, "strict." Not only must an injured plaintiff prove
causation, but the defendant must be unable to prove that the
product met both of the aforementioned standards.
0 2
A manufacturing defect exists when a particular unit of
those goods produced by a manufacturer fails to meet the man-
ufacturer's own expectations, such as when one machine in a
million contains a broken gear.0 3 In such a case, a plaintiff
need prove causation only, and liability is, in fact, strict. Con-
taminated blood products fall into this category.
98.- RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). In states that have enacted
statutes classifying the provision of blood as a service rather than a sale, strict liability
claims based upon products ingested before such legislation will be impossible after
1987, when the longest statute of limitations for blood products expired. Rabkin &
Rabkin, supra note 80, at 2243. Other courts could avoid the application of strict
liability by invoking the rationale of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
comment K, which states:
"There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge
are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.
These are especially common in the field of drugs .... Such a product,
properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not
defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other
drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot
legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician."
Id. It appears likely that courts could make the required finding that the benefits of
using coagulants, in light of the irreducibly low incidence of HIV infection, outweigh
the risks of such use.






Liability for AIDS-Contaminated Blood
1. Economic Effects of Strict Liability
Under a rule of strict liability, producers are responsible
for both negligently and non-negligently caused accidents.
Assuming an inelastic demand, producers will pass the cost of
non-negligent accidents caused by a product through to pur-
chasers of that product by incorporating such costs in the price
charged.10 4 The price charged for a producer's product under
strict liability will, therefore, reflect the full social cost of the
use of that product.
Strict liability may thus perform an important informa-
tional function. If buyers of a product misperceive the full
social cost of a product (which includes the expected value of
any injuries caused by the product), they will consume a
suboptimal amount.10 5 Strict liability will correct this subop-
timal consumption by informing buyers of the full social cost
of a product through its price.
Strict liability will also have the effect of creating an
insurance pool for consumers of the product. When such con-
sumers are unable to procure first-party or other forms of
insurance more cheaply, this may be beneficial. However,
because the expected value of losses varies among consumers, a
pricing scheme that allocates strict liability losses among buy-
ers on an "average loss" or pro rata basis will cause cross-subsi-
dization of those with a high expected risk value by those with
a low expected risk value." If such cross-subsidization is high
enough to justify searching out firms with less cross-subsidiza-
tion, buyers will do so or may leave the market altogether.
However, as demand nears inelasticity, as in the case of emer-
gency blood consumers, the amount of cross-subsidization
needed to provoke market exit will increase.
A final aspect of strict liability is its effect on the cost of
104. To the degree that demand is elastic, an increase in price will lead to a
decrease in consumption and a loss of profits to the shareholders of the producer. This
will occur when the full social cost of a product, as reflected in the price of a product,
exceeds the full social cost as perceived by the consumer (which may be lower). To
the degree that a consumer thinks he is being overcharged for the product, he will
refrain from buying the product, reducing the manufacturer's profit.
105. See infra pp. 116-17.
106. Some buyers will have a superior ability to take care, and thus avoid a risk.
For them, the expected value of a loss will be lower. Other buyers are less able to
take care, and thus have a higher expected loss value. Further, some buyers will have
unusually high incomes, increasing their potential damages, and thus increasing their
expected loss value above the average. Others will have inordinately low incomes, thus
decreasing their expected damages.
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administering a compensation system. Because there is no
issue of fault under strict liability, no resources will be spent to
resolve that issue at trial.107 Therefore, the total cost of trials
will be lower. Because the total cost of litigation will be lower,
more victims will find it cost effective to bring suit and the
number of trials will increase. If the societal benefit achieved
by compensating more individuals exceeds the increased costs
of trials, a net societal benefit will be achieved. 0 8
IV. How WILL PRODUCERS BEHAVE UNDER VARIOUS RULES?
A. Hospitals
1. No Liability
Hospitals will continue to have an incentive to exercise
due care, even if they are immune from liability for transfu-
sion-related AIDS transmission. Although they would not face
legal liability, they would, nevertheless, be motivated by com-
petition with other hospitals to take due care. Because the full
cost to patients of services provided by hospitals includes the
expected value of accident costs borne by the patient, institu-
tions will have an incentive to take due care in order to reduce
those costs and to minimize the total cost of the service to their
patients. Otherwise, other hospitals would attempt to provide
services at a lower total cost. However, the market discipline
function of competition would have a minimal effect under a
rule of no liability when patients had little knowledge of the
relevant risks. If this were the case, suboptimal consumption
would occur, as described by Shavell.' °9
Such suboptimal consumption seems likely in the case of
hospital patients. The processes that directly determine the
likelihood of infection through blood products are complex and
probably unknowable to the average hospital patient at a cost-
effective price. Although hospitals might then have an incen-
tive to make information available to patients concerning the
relative safety of their blood products, this information may
again be so complex as to be incomprehensible. In such a case,
hospital patients could not use blood safety as a criterion of
comparison; competition would not regulate blood quality.
Only if the quality of transfused blood (or any product of a
107. R. POSNER, supra note 79, at 164.
108. Id.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 86-91.
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hospital) became so low as to harm the reputation of the hospi-
tal, would blood quality become a basis for comparison of hos-
pitals, and thus develop the potential to discipline the
market.110
The foregoing argument is tempered by the fact that only
a minority of consumers in a market, those on the margin,
influence the conduct of producers. Producers will only com-
pete for those buyers who will change their conduct in
response to product changes that are cost effective for the pro-
ducer to implement. Thus, only a minority of blood consumers
would need to be informed of the relative risks associated with
various blood providers for the consumers' choices to induce
providers to offer an optimal degree of blood safety.
Such a market-disciplining minority of consumers is
unlikely to exist among hospital patients. First, the percentage
of blood users who are able to change their usage patterns, and
thus, are theoretically able to discipline the market, will not
include emergency donees who, by definition, will be unable to
choose among hospitals.
Of those remaining, it is likely that most will be unable to
gather and process information on blood risks in a cost effec-
tive manner, given that their total prevention costs, including
the cost of gathering and analyzing such information, must be
lower than $1.82 per unit of blood in order to be economically
efficient.
Even among those informed consumers remaining after
the above groups have been excluded, only those shopping spe-
cifically for the attribute of blood safety will affect the quality
of that attribute by their choices. Most informed consumers
will likely compare hospitals based on a combination of factors
not related to blood safety. For example, some informed con-
sumers may compare hospitals based on the distance they have
to travel to each hospital, the quality of food served, or other
such attributes.
Although blood users themselves may not be able to effec-
tively discipline the market concerning the quality of blood
provided by hospitals, one may argue that insurance companies
might be able to do so. Insurance carriers are likely to possess
accurate information about their claims experience with com-
peting hospitals. Further, insurance carriers would have an
110. See Meyer, A Model of Multiattribute Judgments Under Attribute
Uncertainty and Informational Constraint, 18 J. MARKETING RES. 428 (1981).
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incentive to limit their insureds to the use of only those hospi-
tals providing services at the lowest cost, including the cost of
blood-related infections. This would, in turn, allow insurers to
pass these savings on to their insureds in the form of lower
premiums, improving the insurer's competitive position. Thus,
insureds would benefit from insurers imposing an optimal
level of blood quality on the market.
The above argument is weak in two respects. First, lower
prices for hospital services may be perceived by insureds not as
an indication of safety, but rather, of poor quality. Secondly,
insurers interested only in minimizing the cost of claims may
ignore the value of aesthetic hospital attributes, such as the
quality of the food served or the decor of the hospital. To the
extent that insureds value such attributes, they will be willing
to pay higher premiums to obtain them or to trade blood safety
for more palpable, aesthetically pleasing attributes. This will
result in a market segmentation with an essentially different
product being offered to a new class of insureds. Although
members of the old class of insureds would benefit from
increased blood safety, members of the new class, having
traded blood safety for other attributes, would not. Thus, the
effect on the market of insurers shopping for blood safety will
be mitigated to the extent that this segmentation occurs.
In sum, the number of blood users who will be able to
make an informed choice between hospitals based on blood
safety is likely to be very small. The percentage of these users
who will, in fact, shop for blood safety is likely to be insubstan-
tial and will not effectively discipline the market. Further, the
effect of attribute shopping by insurers will have, at best, only
a partial effect on blood safety.
Aside from the incentives a rule of no liability would gen-
erate for producers, a no liability rule would also generate
incentives for blood users. Under such a rule, blood users
would take due care to avoid infection, and that amount of care
would be greater than that expended by users if producers
were under a rule of negligence or strict liability. This is so
because the total cost of a product depends on how much of
any losses resulting from the use of that product will be borne
by the user. This, in turn, depends on whether no liability,
negligence, or strict liability applies. Under a negligence rule,
the total cost of a product to its user is the sum of the product's
price and the expected value of any non-negligently caused
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accidents. Under a rule of no liability, the total price to the
user again includes both the product's price and the value of
non-negligently caused accidents, but also includes the cost of
those accidents that occur due to the non-negligent failure of
the producer to take due care. In other words, the total prod-
uct cost includes the cost of accidents that occur due to some
minimum of negligence on the part of producers that will
occur even though they have every incentive to take due care,
and take all reasonable steps to do so.
2. Negligence
Under a rule of negligence, hospitals again would have an
incentive to take due care, both in order to compete with other
producers and to avoid legal liability for failing to do so. As
was the case under a no liability standard, buyers' ignorance of
the relative risks and, therefore, of the total cost of goods sold
by competing hospitals, is likely to prevent competitive market
discipline. Suboptimal consumption is also likely to follow, as
was the case under a rule of no liability.
As with a rule of no liability, users under a rule of negli-
gence would have an incentive to take due care because they
would bear the full cost of any losses caused by the non-negli-
gent behavior of producers.
Further, the demand for blood will increase relative to
consumption under a rule of no liability. Imposition of a rule
of negligence liability will force producers to sell a compound
product (blood and "insurance") against infection caused by
the producer's negligence. If the producer can insure against
that risk more cheaply than the user, the user will pay the pro-
ducer, in the form of a higher price for blood, to assume that
risk. The user will then consume relatively more blood
because his total cost for blood and insurance is lower when
the producer supplies the insurance than it is when the user
self-insures.11'
It is likely that hospitals could insure against their own
negligence more cheaply than users. This is so because they
will likely have vastly superior knowledge of the probability of
111. This will be true even in the case of emergency donees, whose demand for
blood is relatively, if not completely, inelastic. This is so because the other product
they are buying, insurance, is a product for which their demand may be highly elastic.
Thus, while their demand for blood is inelastic, their demand for the compound
product of blood and insurance may be considerably more elastic.
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their own negligence as compared to users. Although hospitals
will have slightly inferior knowledge of the potential losses of
users since the hospitals' knowledge will be based on average
loss figures available in the medical and insurance communi-
ties, this disadvantage should be far outweighed by the hospi-
tals' superior knowledge of the probability of their own
negligence.
3. Strict Liability
Under strict liability, hospitals will have an incentive to
take due care since they will want to avoid all losses that they
can eliminate by taking cost effective precautions. Thus, strict
liability, will operate like negligence liability. It has been
observed that imposing strict liability on product manufactur-
ers informs buyers of the product's full cost by incorporating
into its price the expected value of all losses resulting from the
use. 12 This will allow consumers to choose the safest product
by choosing the one with the lowest price. This argument is
unpersuasive, however, in the case of hospitals.
As with many other complex products, the safety of a par-
ticular attribute of a package of hospital services will not be
easily discernible from the total package price because of the
compound nature of such services. Thus, even though the
price of a transfusion may be clearly reflected on a hospital
bill, that information is likely to be only one bit of a confusing
jumble of information regarding many equally important
safety characteristics. The end result will be that, even though
patients have accurate and full information from which they
might judge the safety of a particular hospital's blood, they will
not have the ability to incorporate that information into a cost
effective and comprehensive assessment of the relative safety
of that hospital as compared to others. The task will simply be
too complex.
Another rationale often used to support strict liability for
blood products related infection is that it creates a de facto
insurance policy for users of a product. 11 3 This insurance func-
tion causes a chronic cross-subsidization problem that presents
one of the greatest drawbacks to holding hospitals strictly lia-
ble for AIDS transmission.
112. Blood Product Exemption, supra note 29, at 1107 (fourth rationale for strict
products liability).
113. Id. (third rationale for strict products liability).
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The patients of hospitals, generally elective and emer-
gency donees, usually already have, or have access to, first-
party health insurance. They therefore do not need the addi-
tional insurance provided by a rule of strict liability. Further,
because emergency donees, by definition, cannot elect to do
without blood, they will be unable to escape cross-subsidizing
elective donees by abstaining from blood use. Neither could
emergency donees switch to another provider who might mini-
mize cross-subsidization by providing blood exclusively to
emergency donees. 14
A further drawback of the cross-subsidization caused by
strict liability is that it will reduce the cost to elective donees
of blood transfusions. Those elective donees with higher-than-
average expected loss values will be able to adversely select
against hospitals, thereby artificially lowering the cost that
they pay for blood. Elective donees will therefore consume
more blood products than they would under a rule of negli-
gence, causing inefficient over-consumption.
While the rationale usually invoked for imposing strict lia-
bility on a producer is to "compensate helpless victims" of
harm-producing products by requiring the producers of such
products to bear the losses caused thereby, strict liability for
hospitals would have the opposite result.
Because elective donees will receive the benefit of a cross-
subsidization by emergency donees, elective donees will con-
sume relatively more blood products under a rule of strict lia-
bility than under negligence. More hospital services will be
rendered and more profits realized by the hospitals. Hospitals
will have a "situational" monopoly of emergency blood services
because emergency donees, by definition, cannot refuse to
accept and pay for blood without risking serious health
problems or death. Thus, hospitals will have an incentive to
attract elective donees by exacting monopoly profits from
emergency donees, who would be very unlikely to refuse, and
by using those profits to subsidize elective donees or other hos-
pital services.- 5
114. Cf. Hammond & Shapiro, supra note 55, at 151.
115. Hospitals have a disincentive to pass the cost to elective donees, since elective
donees could reduce consumption or leave the market if the price of blood increased.
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B. Blood Banks
1. No Liability
As with hospitals, blood banks that are under no liability
for damages caused by HIV-infected blood will nevertheless
take due care because of competition from other blood banks.
Unlike the clients of hospitals, the clients of blood banks-hos-
pitals themselves-are likely to be highly sophisticated pur-
chasers. Hospitals are likely to correctly perceive the relative
risks of different blood banks and will be able to correctly
compare the total cost of the products of each. Market compe-
tition should therefore discipline blood banks and provide
them with an incentive to take due care. Further, because hos-
pitals correctly perceive the risk of the products that they buy
from blood banks, Shavell's theory dictates that the amount of
products demanded and the amount supplied would be optimal,
and that suboptimal consumption would not occur.
2. Negligence
Blood banks under a rule of negligence will behave like
hospitals subject to negligence liability. Blood banks will take
due care, both in order to avoid legal liability and to compete
with other blood banks. Hospitals dealing with blood banks
will also take due care to avoid any problems of contributory
or comparative negligence and to avoid bearing the full cost of
any non-negligent accidents. Further, because hospitals will
correctly perceive the risks of receiving negligently and non-
negligently infected products from blood banks, and thus the
full cost of such products, they will again purchase the optimal
amount of blood products, as described in Section 3(B)(1) of
this Comment.
3. Strict Liability
A rule of strict liability for blood banks would be inappro-
priate. As the primary customers of blood banks, hospitals
have expert knowledge of the risks involved with blood prod-
ucts. There is no need to impart that information to them
through the price of the product sold by placing its manufac-
turers under a rule of strict liability.
The insurance function of strict liability is also unneeded
in the case of hospitals. Because of their expertise, hospitals
should have knowledge of the factors relevant to self-insuring
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at least equal to, if not greater than, that possessed by blood
banks. Furthermore, hospitals are likely to have sufficient
commercial sophistication and bargaining power to enable
them to effectively bargain for market insurance. The extra
insurance protection, in the form of strict liability, that would




A rule of no liability for commercial producers of blood
products, most notably factor VIII, may be efficient. Commer-
cial producers would be induced to take due care because of
the same competitive forces that motivate other manufacturers
of blood products.
Hemophiliacs should have knowledge of the relevant risks
of treatment superior to that of elective and emergency
donees. Unlike donees, hemophiliacs have long-term experi-
ence with the products they use. Because hemophilia is heredi-
tary, hemophiliacs are, by definition, related to other
hemophiliacs whose expertise they can share. They may also
belong to hemophiliac support groups." 6 These informal infor-
mation sources could be sufficient to guide them to the safest
coagulant producer.
The cost of such information gathering and processing by
an individual would probably be uneconomical in light of the
present slight risk of factor VIII-related AIDS. Even if produ-
cers failed to take due care under a no liability rule and
thereby multiplied the risk of infection many times over, the
risk might still amount to no more than a negligible sum per
lot of clotting factor used.
This problem could be overcome by a hemophiliac support
group service that could monitor, analyze, and distribute infor-
mation to its members at low marginal cost. If this occurred,
full cost comparisons of factor VIII suppliers would be possible,
and no barrier to market discipline of coagulant producers
would exist through competition.
2. Negligence
Under a negligence rule, producers of factor VIII will have
116. E.g., The National Hemophiliac Foundation.
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little incentive to take due care in order to escape legal liabil-
ity, although they would still have an incentive to take due
care to the extent that competition would discipline them.
This is so because, as stated above, negligence claims brought
by hemophiliacs are practically impossible to prove, thus nulli-
fying the effect of legal liability.
As was the case under a no liability rule, hemophiliacs are
potentially able to distribute data comparing different brands
of factor VIII through hemophiliac support groups. This infor-
mation would allow them to perceive correctly the total cost of
the clotting factor they buy and insure that they will buy the
economically optimal amount.
The imposition of negligence liability in the context of cur-
rent government regulation may cause a geographic cross-sub-
sidization. Because the concentration of HIV-infected donors
varies geographically117 and because the blood used to make
factor VIII is usually collected in the same geographic area in
which the end product is sold, the risk of contracting HIV
through factor VIII varies geographically. Therefore,
hemophiliacs living in high risk areas such as the Northeastern
United States will be exposed to a higher degree of risk than
those living in the Northwest. Theoretically, negligence law
would dictate that the precautions taken by factor VIII produ-
cers should vary geographically, according to the risk. This is
not currently the case, however. All factor VIII, whether pro-
duced in a high risk area, such as New York City, or in a low-
risk area, such as North Dakota, must be prepared using an
identical treatment procedure involving both donor screening
and heat treating.118 Thus, precaution costs, and therefore the
ultimate price of clotting factor, are the same, while the risk
varies geographically. Charging one price to all users, regard-
less of their individual risk, creates cross-subsidization.
3. Strict Liability
Strict liability of commercial factor VIII producers will
have the positive effect of efficiently and accurately informing
hemophiliacs of the total cost of the blood products that they
buy. A rule of strict liability would thus cure the information
problems of factor VIII buyers that would occur under a rule
117. ULENE, supra note 13, at 49-53.
118. See supra note 39.
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of no liability or negligence if hemophiliacs failed to form sup-
port groups.
However, strict liability also creates severe cross-subsidiza-
tion problems. The amount of damages incurred by each hem-
ophiliac will vary according to his age and potential income.
Thus, young hemophiliacs with relatively long life expectan-
cies and high earning potentials would be subsidized by elderly
hemophiliacs with short life expectancies and low earning
potentials.
Aside from these cross-subsidization problems, spreading
the cost of factor VIII among hemophiliacs by holding commer-
cial producers strictly liable is likely to be economically unfea-
sible. As the number of hemophiliacs with AIDS increases, the
total expense to be spread will increase. Assuming that AIDS-
related deaths will greatly outpace births among hemophiliacs,
the pool over which the risk would be spread will decrease,
increasing the cost borne by each member of the pool. The
total long-term cost to each of those hemophiliacs who outlive
all those currently infected could well total tens of thousands
of dollars, likely exceeding the ability of most hemophiliacs to
pay. 119
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis indicates that efficient rules of lia-
bility must be narrowly tailored to take into account the eco-
nomic interaction of the parties to a given purchase and sale.
In the case of hospital transactions with emergency and
elective donees, a rule of negligence liability should be estab-
lished. A rule of strict liability would be undesirable because,
although it would impart accurate information to consumers of
hospital services, that information would be useless because of
the complexity of the calculation in which it would be used.
Negligence liability would correct suboptimal purchasing
by elective donees that would be caused by the cross-subsidiza-
tion occurring under a rule of strict liability. Further, negli-
gence liability may be necessary to discipline the market.
Because it is unlikely that consumers of hospital services
would be able to shop among hospitals specifically for the attri-
119. This cost would be in addition to the already significant cost hemophiliacs
must pay for the factor VIII, estimated to be $4,500 to $13,000 per year. BLOOD POLICY,
supra note 71, at 8.
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bute of blood safety, imposition of a negligence standard may
be necessary to ensure that due care is taken by hospitals.
Judicial action may be necessary to implement a standard
of negligence liability for hospitals. Because of informational
constraints, it is unlikely that a sufficient percentage of health
care consumers will bargain specifically over blood safety. If
so, market discipline would fail to establish the proper level of
blood safety. Judicial imposition of a negligence liability rule
would thus eliminate the effects of high transaction costs
resulting from a lack of information on the part of health care
consumers that would otherwise prevent market discipline.
Between blood banks and hospitals, a rule of no liability or
negligence liability should be imposed. Under a rule of no lia-
bility, competition among blood banks would likely ensure that
they take due care. Hospitals, as experts, would have adequate
information to choose among blood banks and could thereby
discipline the market.
Negligence liability would have the same effects, but
would be more efficient in disciplining the market. This is so
because legal liability for negligence would have an immediate
effect on producers' incentives to take due care in the form of
money damages, while the incentives of competition among
producers would be long range and less precise. This would be
an important consideration only to the extent that blood banks
were "short term" market participants.
However, a negligence standard would be more costly for
the parties to enforce. Trials would be needed to establish lia-
bility; and because the negligence standard is relatively vague,
those trials would be expensive. A rule of no liability would
entail none of these enforcement costs. Thus, the issue is
whether the efficiency gains inherent in the immediate incen-
tives of negligence liability would be worth the added costs of
enforcement of that standard through trials.
This question should be answered through the process of
contractual bargaining. Contractual bargaining is appropriate
in the case of the hospital/blood bank transaction because hos-
pitals have bargaining power equal to that of blood banks.
Further, allowing hospitals and blood banks to bargain over
the standard of liability from positions of equal strength will
assure that the optimal standard, as determined by the parties,
is implemented.
As between commercial blood products manufacturers and
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hemophiliacs, a rule of no liability or negligence liability
should be established. Under either rule, hemophiliacs are
likely to have sufficient information to correctly choose among
coagulant manufacturers and thereby discipline the market.
However, the choice between rules of no liability or negligence
liability is subject to the same considerations of enforcement
costs as described above in connection with the hospital/blood
bank transaction. Unlike the hospital/blood bank transaction,
however, the commercial producer/hemophiliac transaction
may not be properly resolvable by bargaining.
Because the number of blood products manufacturers is
small, a natural geographic monopoly may exist that would
eliminate hemophiliacs' ability to bargain and the resultant dis-
ciplining effect of competition. Judicial imposition of a negli-
gence standard would ensure that due care is observed to avoid
liability, rather than out of fear of competition, and would pro-
vide optimal incentives for both hemophiliacs and commercial
coagulant producers.
George Ferrell
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